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Henry . Loman 
guilty plea to possession 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Timothy Arredondo was on patrol 
he recognized from previous drug-related 
encountered Loman, 
, Officer Arredondo "conducted a 
there was an outstanding for Loman's arrest. 
Officer Arredondo decided to wait for Loman to leave a 
Loman entered "for a short amount of time." (Tr., p.8, Ls.16-23.) 
the residence, he "got into the passenger seat and another male 
12-
which 
Loman 
identified as Tex Mason got into driver's seat." (Tr., p.8, Ls.23-2S.) Loman 
and Mason "sat in the vehicle for quite a while with the vehicle running." (Tr., p.8, 
- p.9, L.2.) Officer Arredondo watched Loman "messing with 
at his and "[i]nstead of waiting for him off, with the 
" Officer Arredondo "decided to go ahead and stop 
in the car." (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-7.) 
Officer Arredondo pulled up behind Loman's vehicle, 
overhead lights, and got out of patrol car. , p.9, 
by "immediately jump[ing]" out the car 
(Tr., p.9, Ls.23-2S.) "Arredondo 
and ordered on 
1 
p.10, LA.) Officer Arredondo told Loman there was a warrant for his arrest and 
instructed him to put his hands behind his back. (Tr., p.10, Ls.3-4.) Rather than 
comply with Officer Arredondo's instructions, Loman started taking off his coat. 
(Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) Officer Arredondo told Loman to leave his coat on and again 
told him to put his hands behind his back. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-9.) Loman continued 
to ignore Officer Arredondo, pulled away as Officer Arredondo reached for him, 
"took his coat off real quick, threw it in the car and shut the door." (Tr., p.i0, 
Ls.9-1i.) Officer Arredondo then placed Loman in handcuffs and "retrieved the 
coat out of the vehicle." (Tr., p.1 0, l,23 - p.11, 1.) After Officer Arredondo 
removed the coat from the car and "threw it down on the ground" while he 
completed his pat down of Loman and requested a transport unit. (Tr., p.11, 
Ls.17-22.) Mason remained in the car as this was taking place. (Tr., p.11, Ls.22-
24.) 
After arranging for Loman's transport and securing Mason, Officer 
Arredondo searched Loman's coat and discovered "a flashlight containing 
methamphetamine and a meth pipe" in the coat pocket. (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-14; p.21, 
Ls.15-18.) Officer Arredondo then had his canine, Carlo, "do a free air sniff of the 
vehicle." (Tr., p.13, l,25 - p.14, l,2.) Carlo "gave a positive indication when 
presented the passenger-side door handle of the vehicle." (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-7.) A 
further search of the car based on Carlo's alert revealed no additional drugs. 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.) 
The state charged Loman with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.51-52.) The state also filed an Information 
2 
was 
one 
is a persistent violator. a nnrynnn 
search of his coat and 
rights. (R., pp.74-79.) The a 
which it denied his request for 
Loman filed a motion 
because, at the time of 
confirmation of the outstanding (R., 11 6.) 
motion reconsider. (R., p.121.) 
subsequently entered a conditional plea to possession a 
substance, reserving his to appeal the denial of motion 
1 (R., 126-140.) The court imposed a unified six-year sentence with 
fixed. (R., pp.158-161.) Loman filed a notice appeal 
of judgment. (R., pp.166-168.) 
the plea agreement, the 
(R., p.126.) 
3 
from the 
ISSUE 
Loman states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied 
suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Loman's to 
Has Loman failed to establish the district court erred in denying motion 
to suppress the evidence discovered pursuant to a search incident to arrest 
on a warrant? 
4 
contends in denying motion to suppress, 
search was an improper search to arrest. 
that he his in the despite 
remove it, the search his coat must satisfy one of the two 
556 U.S. (2009). 
that because neither exception applies in 
suppression was (Appellant's 13-16.) 
argument fails because the search of his coat was not conducted as part of an 
automobile search to arrest. Alternatively, Loman was not to 
suppression because the search was properly conducted pursuant to the 
41 
exception based upon the probable cause provided 
standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we the trial court's 
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, we 
of constitutional principles to 
,730,117 3d 142, 1 (Ct. 
5 
facts as found," 
2005). 
The District Court Correctly Concluded Suppression Was Not Required 
The Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to warrant requirement." State v . 
.:....:o.:::..:..:..:::...L' 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. 443, 454-55 (1971); 133 Idaho 474, 
479, 988 P.2d 700, (Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a well-
requirement and, as such, does not violate 
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); 
134 Idaho at 874, 11 P .3d at 493. With respect to searches of 
automobiles conducted solely incident to an individual's arrest, the Supreme 
Court in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), adopted the following legal 
standard: "Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest 
only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence 
of the offense of " 129 S.Ct. at 1723. Although the search of 
Loman's coat not satisfy either of the exceptions set forth in Gant, the 
search of Loman's coat did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Gant 
does not apply since the search Loman's coat was not part of an automobile 
search incident to arrest. 
When Officer Arredondo first made contact with Loman, Loman was 
outside his vehicle and wearing his coat. At that time, Officer Arredondo advised 
Loman there was a warrant his arrest and instructed him to put his hands 
6 
coat and 
was arrested. 
as he was instructed, 
request to the coat on and put 
threw the coat inside the car 
facts 
placed Loman 
but did 
Loman's coat 
handcuffs 
it until after 
not 
a search of his car pursuant to his arrest, occurred as a search 
incident to his arrest. 
legal 
P.2d 637 (Ct. App. 
therefore, as 
forth in State v. Bowman, 134 176, 
to search of Loman's 
In Bowman, an stopped men believing one of them had an 
outstanding arrest warrant. 134 Idaho 1 997 P.2d at 638. The men agreed 
to talk to the officer the individual whom the officer believed to be the subject 
of the outstanding identified himself as Bowman. kL at 177-178, 
997 at 638-639. While officer was running a warrants check, a woman 
came out of an adjacent 
P.2d at 639. After the learned 
and approached kLat178, 
Bowman had a warrant for arrest, 
"but prior to informing Bowman that he was under arrest," the officer "observed 
Bowman take of his and it to the woman." The 
exited his vehicle, told Bowman was under arrest advised the woman she 
was allowed to take jacket. The woman handed the jacket 
the who searched it and a pipe, 
methamphetamine. kL 
7 
On appeal, the Court considered whether Bowman was entitled 
suppression of the evidence found in his coat. In deciding there was no 
Amendment violation, the Court of Appeals first noted "[a] search incident an 
arrest is a well-established exception to warrant requirement." Bowman, 1 
Idaho at 179, 997 P.2d at 640. The Court also discussed the justifications 
underlying the exception and held: 
To allow a defendant to hand over an article of clothing just before 
his arrest and thereby avoid the search of said item would seriously 
undercut the purposes and policy behind the search incident to that 
arrest - ensuring the safety of officers and bystanders through the 
recovery of weapons within the defendant's area of immediate 
control and preventing the loss or destruction of evidence of 
criminal activity. Faced with the possibility that the jacket might 
contain a weapon or evidence of a crime which could be lost or 
destroyed, we conclude that [the officer1 acted reasonably in 
requesting the jacket in order to search it incident to Bowman's 
arrest. We hold that such search did not violate Bowman's 
constitutional rights. 
Bowman, 134 Idaho at 180, 997 P.2d at 641 (footnote omitted). 
The district court accurately noted the facts of Bowman are "about as 
dead on point as we're going to find in a search and seizure case in the state of 
Idaho." (Tr., p.36, Ls.13-16.) Despite the significant similarities 
case and Bowman, Loman argues "Bowman offers little guidance" because it 
"was decided prior to Gant." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This argument might have 
merit if this case involved a search of an automobile incident to arrest, but 
because the coat was not searched as part of the automobile, the timing of the 
Bowman decision vis-a-vis Gant is irrelevant. 
Loman also argues that Bowman is distinguishable because, he asserts, 
unlike in Bowman, "all of the non-police parties involved in the case at hand were 
8 
was no 
remained on 
scene was Brief, 5.) The 
lacks is 
were when the coat was ultimately searched 
provides no distinction nCHHIQ 
woman in 
=.:..::..:.::..:.=..:' handcuffed, 
at the time it was either, officer's 
possession time the search 
=~.:..:::;.:.-'. on this basis is unpersuasive. 
second part of Loman's argument Bowman 
lacks merit. It appears Loman misunderstands concern relating to 
evidence being lost or destroyed. This a incident arrest 
is not intended to protect suspect from having his drugs or destroyed, it is 
prevent the suspect or, in this case (and in =-"'-'-'-'-'-'-=-'-1' the suspect's companion 
from destroying evidence. The Fourth allow individuals 
avoid a lawful search by thwarting lawful by an officer. See State v. 
Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 922, 1 P.3d 11 1161 (2007) (holding that suspect 
2 Loman erroneously asserts the district court made a contrary factual finding on 
this point. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This assertion is incorrect. The portion of 
the transcript Loman cites for this proposition reveals that the district court merely 
made an analogy between the woman who was handed coat and Bowman 
and the access Mason had the coat when it was lying in the passenger seat. 
(Tr., p.39, Ls.16-21.) While Mason was subsequently detained and the coat was 
searched after that, he still access to it when Loman first threw the coat 
inside the car. 
9 
could not thwart a 
home). 
if 
Loman threw it 
arrest initiated in a public place by fleeing 
Arredondo could not remove the coat from car 
search it to arrest, suppression would not 
required because a search of the inside the vehicle would have been proper 
following Carlo's positive alert. The exception is a 
exception to the requirement. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 
(1980); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho , 800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 (1 
automobile exception 
of a vehicle 
contraband or 
requirement authorizes a warrantless 
is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains 
of crimina! 152 Idaho 115, 266 
P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App. 11). Probable cause to search Loman's vehicle 
arose when 
been sitting. 
App. 2007) ("An 
on the passenger door of the car where loman had 
1 Idaho 871, 875, 172 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Ct. 
by an otherwise reliable, certified drug detection dog is 
sufficient to demonstrate cause to believe contraband is present even if 
there exists a possibility that the dog has alerted to residual odors."). Thus, even 
if the coat had remained in the car, law enforcement could have searched it 
following Carlo's positive alert. 
loman correctly notes that the district court rejected the state's argument 
the coat could been searched pursuant to the automobile exception. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.1 17.) However, a review of the transcript reveals that in 
doing so that Loman's act of throwing the coat back in the 
10 
car was cause. 
conceal it in the car was 
encompass the totality the circumstances. 
was Carlo's which, alone, provided the car. 
district court should considered this factor and search 
on alternative basis.3 
Loman's was arrest, 
district court correctly concluded denied Loman's 
Alternatively, the court's ruling may affirmed on automobile 
exception. 
3 The court only considered Carlo's alert in relation to the 
the drugs in Loman's coat pocket would have been found pursuant 
inevitable discovery doctrine. (Tr., p.28, Ls.4-22; p.4D, L.22 - p.41, L.6.) 
court rejected this argument after concluding the state's 
only on "suspicion" that had the coat "stayed in the vehicle, the have 
alerted and ultimately would have found the odor on " (Tr., p.41, .1-
5.) The evidence introduced at the hearing was that 
court's conclusion that dog would not have alerted inside 
vehicle is what is speculative. 
11 
state respectfully 
30th day 
I HEREBY that I have this 30th day of April, 201 a 
of the attached OF RESPONDENT by a 
ALLRED 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DER 
in State Appellate Defender's basket 
Court Clerk's office. 
12 
